Prompt and competent response, as expected from bunny.
"Last week, one of our infrastructure providers reported unauthorized access involving third-party server management software. One of our CDN nodes, located in Armenia, was hosted on a server supplied by this provider.
After receiving the alert from the affected provider, our engineering team took immediate action. Within 20 minutes, we stopped routing traffic through the server. We then reviewed and preserved the relevant security logs for investigation, securely wiped the server, and revoked its access to our other systems. The affected server has been permanently removed from our infrastructure."
It looked like competent,but some of the events look really bad for the company. Especially the fact that TLS certificates that customers entrusted bunny now need to be revoked by the customers themselves. This detail was at the very last of the email I got and it was the only part I did not like, because it means customer secrets were indeed compromised. I hope they followed up with all the customers on revoking those certificates.
> because it means customer secrets were indeed compromised.
It does not mean secrets were compromised. It means: If there is a risk customer secrets were compromised, the right thing to do is to assume they were and refresh everything. Even if there's no evidence of it.
it looks like they are doing automatic renewal of certificates, the only ones that customers have to do themselves is the ones the customers uploaded themselves
It's not really misleading. A lot of people here use Bunny and this is a relevant security incident. It's not a major failing but rather a "hey shit happened come make sure if it applies to you that you respond in kind".
NGL it's the exact wording I'd personally like to see from a product that had an infra provider have an incident just so that I can mentally tune in enough to figure out if I need to care.
Do I need to post the Rickover responsibility copypasta again? Simply put service providers own their outsourcing decisions and those consequences. Getting popped by shitty hosting services is a risk of using those services.
Bunny is doing the right thing here and owning it.
> After receiving the alert from the affected provider, our engineering team took immediate action. Within 20 minutes, we stopped routing traffic through the server. We then reviewed and preserved the relevant security logs for investigation, securely wiped the server, and revoked its access to our other systems. The affected server has been permanently removed from our infrastructure.
When responding to a potential breach, the correct protocol is to contain the incident and PRESERVE EVERYTHING for investigation. Do not try to be selective at what data you keep or don't keep. They've unfortunately likely destroyed evidence and will not be able to determine if the attacker actually breached the server or not, and if so, how. This speaks to them having a poor or non-existent incident response plan.
While neither investigation has found any indication of unauthorized access to our server, we cannot completely rule out the possibility.
If unauthorized access to our CDN node did occur, the potentially exposed information would have been: temporarily cached CDN content, Pull Zone configurations, and TLS certificates stored on that server.
As an additional precaution, we have revoked and reissued all TLS certificates for bunny. net platform domains (b-cdn. net and bunny. run). Reissuance of managed TLS certificates for custom domains is ongoing and is expected to be completed within the next 24 hours. No action is required from customers using managed certificates. We will post a further update on our status page once this process is complete.
If you manage your own TLS certificates, we recommend revoking and reissuing them with new private keys as a precaution.
No other customer data, including bunny. net account data, was stored on the server in question, and no internal systems were affected.
so it seems like the underlying provider potentially allowed, for instance, disk read, that above is what bunny says might have been on disk in this case? Am I reading that right?
> Last week, one of our infrastructure providers reported unauthorized access involving third-party server management software. One of our CDN nodes, located in Armenia, was hosted on a server supplied by this provider
Are they talking about physical security? Someone grabbed the server, etc?
Colocation providers usually don't care about security beyond that, or has that changed?
php.net is on Bunny to my knowledge and so is PECL for example. Great potential for compromised packages if this hadn't been caught , but I don't know the blast radius since the victim would need to connect to this particular CDN
It is not just you. I wasn't actively reading for a few days, came back from a short trip and there is like 5 open security breaches on the top page right now.
Some time ago my colleague and I were doing some due-diligence on Bunny as a potential service provider.
We asked them some basic security questions, nothing low-level, just some basic high-level overview type of stuff to roughly check if they were following well-known best-practices.
Their response was a consistent and constant "cannot tell you due to security reasons".
That rang alarm bells. Any provider such as them who is not sufficiently confident in their security to be willing and able to discuss security at a high-level perspective is not worthy of trust as far as I am concerned.
It's fairly well known that Bunny don't own the servers in their cdn pops so they will always be subject to the security of the people they lease etc from. If you wanted good security you gotta pay for it. Bunny are very much at the budget end of the market segment - servers cost money no way around it.
One Armenian server provider got compromised, Bunny assumed (rightfully) compromise of their servers in that one POP and issued a timely set of responses.
As a customer, I couldn't ask anything more. No ambiguity, no downplaying, no word salads. If anything this incident increased my confidence in the company.
"Last week, one of our infrastructure providers reported unauthorized access involving third-party server management software. One of our CDN nodes, located in Armenia, was hosted on a server supplied by this provider.
After receiving the alert from the affected provider, our engineering team took immediate action. Within 20 minutes, we stopped routing traffic through the server. We then reviewed and preserved the relevant security logs for investigation, securely wiped the server, and revoked its access to our other systems. The affected server has been permanently removed from our infrastructure."
> If you manage your own TLS certificates, we recommend revoking and reissuing them with new private keys as a precaution.
Only if you manage them yourself. If Bunny is managing them for you, they'll roll them for you.
It does not mean secrets were compromised. It means: If there is a risk customer secrets were compromised, the right thing to do is to assume they were and refresh everything. Even if there's no evidence of it.
Call me pathologically unbiased, but I doubt this same article written by Cloudflare would get this response.
https://lowendtalk.com/discussion/222315/gcore-compromised-v...
The title is heavily misleading.
NGL it's the exact wording I'd personally like to see from a product that had an infra provider have an incident just so that I can mentally tune in enough to figure out if I need to care.
Bunny is doing the right thing here and owning it.
When responding to a potential breach, the correct protocol is to contain the incident and PRESERVE EVERYTHING for investigation. Do not try to be selective at what data you keep or don't keep. They've unfortunately likely destroyed evidence and will not be able to determine if the attacker actually breached the server or not, and if so, how. This speaks to them having a poor or non-existent incident response plan.
Are they talking about physical security? Someone grabbed the server, etc?
Colocation providers usually don't care about security beyond that, or has that changed?
maybe it's my brain just primed or attacks picked up pace recently
Some time ago my colleague and I were doing some due-diligence on Bunny as a potential service provider.
We asked them some basic security questions, nothing low-level, just some basic high-level overview type of stuff to roughly check if they were following well-known best-practices.
Their response was a consistent and constant "cannot tell you due to security reasons".
That rang alarm bells. Any provider such as them who is not sufficiently confident in their security to be willing and able to discuss security at a high-level perspective is not worthy of trust as far as I am concerned.
TL;DR you get what you pay for.
As a customer, I couldn't ask anything more. No ambiguity, no downplaying, no word salads. If anything this incident increased my confidence in the company.
Oh right because American tech companies are not equally capable of shitty security.
Remind me, oh yeah ... it was just TODAY we saw that Azure exploit providing full cross-tenant compromise.
A big part of why European companies are turning away from American companies is the sort of MAGA bullshit you just demonstrated.
Oh wait.